Frithjof Schuon was the leading figure in the perennialist school of comparative religious thought.

This collection of letters by Frithjof Schuon, the foremost spokesman of the perennial philosophy, contains nearly 200 newly translated letters from Schuon's youth to old age as written to friends, spiritual seekers, scholars, and others. Among the letters are those that address, in a simpler and more accessible manner, the same metaphysical subjects that continually recur in Schuon's published works. Other letters relate to the spiritual life in its simple and concrete aspects, by answering such fundamental questions as "Why (...) is there evil in the world?", "How can I recognize if I am on a wrong path?", and "What should I do to be saved?" Finally, there are letters that relate to various aspects of Schuon's life, most of which were written to his closest friends. While not a comprehensive autobiography, these letters offer an intimate view of certain key moments in his life. Taken as a whole, the present collection of letters offers insights into the content of Frithjof Schuon's message-his exposition of the perennial philosophy-as well as a glimpse into his life as messenger of that philosophy. (shrink)

"I have met with no more impressive work in the comparative study of Oriental and Occidental religion". -- T.S. Eliot. A momentous volume.

This work gathers together essays by eighteen internationally known scholars, including Huston Smith, James Cutsinger, Philip Sherrard and Martin Lings. Frithjof Schuon's considerable influence on the thinking of contemporary philosophers and specialists in comparative religion is reflected in the wide range of contributions which make up this fascinating volume.

With extraordinary elegance and philosophic power, Frithjof Bergmann presents a genuine rethinking of freedom. By changing the focus from outside to inside the person, Bergmann shows how freedom can be a reality in self-growth, parenting, education, and in shaping a society that stimulates rather than stunts the self.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Purpose of Hegel's System FRITHJOF H. BERGMANN THIS ESSAYIS MEANTtO answer the question: what was Hegel really trying to do; what was the program that his system attempted to execute; what was the general enterprise that his philosophy sought to perform? Two things are clear: (1) Hegel insisted that philosophy had to be systematic. He ridiculed philosophers who made disconnected assertions and accused them of "shallowness" and (...) of "inspirationalism." The systematic exposition of philosophy was for Hegel synonymous with doing philosophy scientifically. If a proposition was not presented in the context of a philosophic system, it could not be more than a bald and unsupported assertion that did not merit serious philosophical consideration? (2) Hegel claimed that his own system demonstrated the "necessity" of its contents. The majority of the German Hegel scholars, Haym, Haering, Fischer, Rosenzweig, and Glockner, for example, never attempted to arrive at a precise explication of the function of Hegel's system or of his concept of necessity. They were interested in altogether different questions. The Englishspeaking scholars are generally agreed that by "necessity" Hegel meant "deductive certainty" or something very akin to it and that his system was therefore intended to demonstrate the indubitability, the certainty, or the a priority, of the propositions it contains. The deductions of Hegel's system were, according to them, designed to guarantee the factual truth of the statements derived. The general function of the system was to eliminate doubt. Stace, for example, defends this interpretation in his well-known book The Philosophy of Hegel. 2 In fact, he regards this claim to deductive certainty as the "cardinal claim" of Hegel's philosophy and extends it furthermore beyond the limits of Hegel's system so that, according to him, every possible true proposition can be established with logical necessity. Stace says: If we could discover a first principle, and could prove that it followed by logical necessity from that first principle that there must be a world and that it must be just the sort of world it is, then we should have an explanation.... Thus a philosophy which would genuinely explain the world will take as its first principle not a cause but a reason. From this first reason it will proceed to deduce the world, not as an effect, but as a logical consequent. We shall then see not merely that things are as they are, but we shall see why xCf. Preface to the Phenomenology. W. T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1955). [189] 190 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY they are as they are. This is the fundamental Hegelian idea of explanation. This is what tIegel's philosophy attempts to do? Later in the book Stace examines the "extraordinary position" which Hegel "takes up" on the question of the "contingency of nature." Hegel, as Stace points out, believed that particular facts and things cannot be deduced, that the "details of nature.., are governed by contingency and caprice." This position, according to Stace, "will not bear examination." Stace ascribes to tIegel the premise that "there is in this stone, or this man, nothing but thought, nothing but universals," and it, in Stace's opinion, implies that everything can be deduced. "If we are to have an idealistic monism it must explain everything from its single first principle, thought. And that means that it must deduce everything. To leave anything outside the network of deduction, to declare anything utterly undeducible, is simply dualism." * To answer this interpretation thoroughly, the character and purpose of Hegel's system has to be explained. This we shall attempt in the remainder of this essay. But three points can be made in a preliminary way: 1) Is the position which Hegel did not hold, but which he should have held, according to Stace, any more tenable than the position which Stace rejects as inconsistent? Is it really conceivable that every last fact concerning tile universe--including the number of hairs on Hegel's head--could be "logically deduced" from a first principle? 2) Did Hegel really accept the premise which in Stace's opinion implies that every fact must be deducible? This would certainly be important, since Ilegel... (shrink)

Geistige Einsichten eines der bedeutendsten Religionsphilosophen In längeren und kürzeren Betrachtungen versucht der Autor die Urlehre zu ergründen, jenes "durch Menschenalter hindurch stets neugestaltig wiederkehrende und ewig sich gleich bleibende Wissen von den letzten Zusammenhängen." Mit seinen Gedanken möchte Frithjof Schuon den Leser zu einer Weltanschauung führen, die den ganzen Menschen umfasst, die lebendig und tiefgründig ist. Äußerlich besehen reihen sich die Betrachtungen in diesem Buch beinahe zusammenhanglos aneinander, doch innerlich sind sie geschlossen und eindeutig. So liegt dieses Buch (...) vor uns wie ein nie gewordener und nie beschlossener Gedankenkreis. (shrink)

Recently a number of writers have argued that a new form of relativism involves a form of semantic context-dependence which helps it escape the perhaps most common objection to ordinary contextualism; that it cannot accommodate our intuitions about disagreement. I argue: (i) In order to evaluate this claim we have to pay closer attention to the nature of our intuitions about disagreement. (ii) We have different such intuitions concerning different questions: we have more stable disagreement intuitions about moral disputes than (...) about, say, disputes about matters of taste. (iii) The new form of relativism does not vindicate the stable intuitions about disagreement. (iv) It does a better job explaining the unstable intuitions than contextualism. But, pace some relativists, it is not clear that assertion-truth rather than just proposition-truth has to be relativized to accomplish this. (shrink)

Frithjof Schuon s work is a unique guide for souls seeking clarity in complex times.In this revised edition, fully retranslated from the original French, the book s signature essay, "To Have a Center," focuses on restoring ourselves to our full birthright as beings "made in God s image." Additional essays explore such themes as genius, intelligence.

The first part of this paper argues that the various contending positions in the contemporary Theory of Value share one tacit presupposition, namely that the world of facts is value?neutral. Some of the sources of this premise are identified and a critique attempts to show that it cannot be defended. The second part delineates the general implications that the abandonment of this premise would have for the Theory of Value and outlines an alternative position.

In this paper, we wish to propose a notion Kunstangst [Danish for art anxiety] as a designation for the destabilising and transformative state that art can impose on its spectator. To this day, art discourse and curation continue to be shaped by Enlightenment ideals. This legacy urges us to dispose of our individuality, either by putting ourselves in someone else’s place or by striving towards objectivity and repeatability. We regard this as highly problematic, and to question the scientific, rational, and (...) disinterested approaches, we have chosen to investigate a more personal, intimate relation between artwork and spectator. The notion Kunstangst derives from the existentialist concept of anxiety, which originates in the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard. We hope that the transfer of this existentialist concept will provide us with a new aesthetic tool that can enable us to undo the chains of Enlightenment thought and help us approximate the intensity at the heart of aesthetic experience. Aiding us in the appropriation of such an abstract philosophical concept and its application to aesthetics, we incorporate the research of psychologist Kazimierz Dabrowski. He claims that external conflicts can evoke anxiety, which can – if properly engaged with – become transformative experiences. Following this line of reasoning in an aesthetic context, we believe that this is how the art experience can have transformative potential. (shrink)

In Pninis grammar of Sanskrit one finds the ivastras, a table which defines the natural classes of phonological segments in Sanskrit by intervals. We present a formal argument which shows that, using his representation method, Pninis way of ordering the phonological segments to represent the natural classes is optimal. The argument is based on a strictly set-theoretical point of view depending only on the set of natural classes and does not explicitly take into account the phonological features of the segments, (...) which are, however, implicitly given in the way a language clusters its phonological inventory. The key idea is to link the graph of the Hasse-diagram of the set of natural classes closed under intersection to ivastra-style representations of the classes. Moreover, the argument is so general that it allows one to decide for each set of sets whether it can be represented with Pninis method. Actually, Pnini had to modify the set of natural classes to define it by the ivastras (the segment h plays a special role). We show that this modification was necessary and, in fact, the best possible modification. We discuss how every set of classes can be modified in such a way that it can be defined in a ivastra-style representation.1. (shrink)

New results in ergodic theory show that averages of repeated measurements will typically diverge with probability one if there are random errors in the measurement of time. Since mean-square convergence of the averages is not so susceptible to these anomalies, we are led again to compare the mean and pointwise ergodic theorems and to reconsider efforts to determine properties of a stochastic process from the study of a generic sample path. There are also implications for models of time and the (...) interaction between observer and observable. (shrink)

L'auteur aborde l'illusion transcendantale de Kant, la méthode génético-critique de Feuerbach, l'aliénation de Marx, le renversement du platonisme de Nietzsche, le surmoi de Freud, etc. Selon lui, la conjonction et la coordination des deux termes de logique et transcendance supposent une discrimination implacable : celle du principe de réalité.

A collection of essays provoking an unusually rich description of what constitutes the prerogatives and fulfillment of the human state.

In a recent article in this journal, Esteban Céspedes (2015) seeks to defend the contrastive account of singular causation from my criticisms (Steglich-Petersen 2012). Céspedes objects to my argument on three counts: (1) it is circular in presupposing a principle that it seeks to establish; (2) that same principle is false; and (3) even if the principle were true, it would not speak against the contrastive account. In this note I argue that all three objections are unconvincing.

Motivational externalists and internalists of various sorts disagree about the circumstances under which it is conceptually possible to have moral opinions but lack moral motivation. Typically, the evidence referred to are intuitions about whether people in certain scenarios who lack moral motivation count as having moral opinions. People’s intuitions about such scenarios diverge, however. I argue that the nature of this diversity is such that, for each of the internalist and externalist theses, there is a strong prima facie reason to (...) reject it. That much might not be very controversial. But I argue further, that it also gives us a strong prima facie reason to reject all of these theses. This is possible since there is an overlooked alternative option to accepting any of them: moral motivation pluralism , the view that different internalist and externalist theses correctly accounts for different people’s concepts of moral opinions, respectively. I end the paper with a discussion of methodological issues relevant to the argument for moral motivation pluralism and of the consequences of this view for theories about the nature of moral opinions, such as cognitivism and non-cognitivism. (shrink)

In a certain sense, uncertainty andignorance have been recognized in science andphilosophy from the time of the Greeks.However, the mathematical sciences have beendominated by the pursuit of certainty.Therefore, experiments under simplified andidealized conditions have been regarded as themost reliable source of knowledge. Normally,uncertainty could be ignored or controlled byapplying probability theory and statistics.Today, however, the situation is different.Uncertainty and ignorance have moved intofocus. In particular, the global character ofsome environmental problems has shown that theproblems cannot be disregarded. Therefore,scientists and technologists (...) have in many wayscome into a new situation. The Chernobylaccident is a dramatic example, however,problems such as a possible greenhouse effect,a possible reduction of the ozone layer, and soon are all of the same type. These encompasstotally different problems than scientists andtechnologists are traditionally trained to dealwith. In these cases, the standard use ofstatistics has to change, the burden of proofshould be reversed, one should draw ondifferent kinds of expertise, and, in general,science should be ``democratized.''. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a teleological account of epistemic reasons. In recent years, the main challenge for any such account has been to explicate a sense in which epistemic reasons depend on the value of epistemic properties. I argue that while epistemic reasons do not directly depend on the value of epistemic properties, they depend on a different class of reasons which are value based in a direct sense, namely reasons to form beliefs about certain propositions or subject matters. (...) In short, S has an epistemic reason to believe that p if and only if S is such that if S has reason to form a belief about p, then S ought to believe that p. I then propose a teleological explanation of this relationship. It is also shown how the proposal can avoid various subsidiary objections commonly thought to riddle the teleological account. (shrink)

The theory of belief, according to which believing that p essentially involves having as an aim or purpose to believe that p truly, has recently been criticised on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not interact with the wider aims of believers in the ways we should expect of genuine aims. I argue that this objection to the aim theory fails. When we consider a wider range of deliberative contexts concerning beliefs, it becomes obvious that the aim (...) of belief can interact with and be weighed against the wider aims of agents in the ways required for it to be a genuine aim. (shrink)

Epistemic instrumentalists seek to understand the normativity of epistemic norms on the model practical instrumental norms governing the relation between aims and means. Non-instrumentalists often object that this commits instrumentalists to implausible epistemic assessments. I argue that this objection presupposes an implausibly strong interpretation of epistemic norms. Once we realize that epistemic norms should be understood in terms of permissibility rather than obligation, and that evidence only occasionally provide normative reasons for belief, an instrumentalist account becomes available that delivers the (...) correct epistemic verdicts. On this account, epistemic permissibility can be understood on the model of the wide-scope instrumental norm for instrumental rationality, while normative evidential reasons for belief can be understood in terms of instrumental transmission. (shrink)

Causation is of undeniable importance to our understanding of, and interaction with our surroundings. Despite this, the correct understanding of causation remains subject to considerable philosophical controversy. In this article, I introduce the most influential philosophical theories of causation, and provide an overview of the main difficulties that has led to the currently most popular versions of these theories.

This article addresses the relationship between content, voice, and body language in persuasive communication and the contribution of these three elements of persuasive performances to its overall persuasiveness. Findings are presented from two separate laboratory experiments. In the first experiment three versions of a video displaying a speech were shown to three different groups of participants: without vocal emphasis and without gestures of the speaker, with vocal emphasis but without gestures, with vocal emphasis and gestures. Audio tracks of the first (...) two experimental conditions were later used in the second experiment to analyze the effects of vocal emphasis when no visual cues are present. Measurement included a questionnaire as well as Real Time Response-measurement. It was found that content dominates the effect of the speech; emphasis and gestures, however, improved the perception of some features of the speech, such as liveliness and power. Audio-only versions yielded similar results but were rated more favorably in general. (shrink)

Nishi Shah has recently argued that transparency in doxastic deliberation supports a strict version of evidentialism about epistemic reasons. I argue that Shah's argument relies on a principle that is incompatible with the strict version of evidentialism Shah wishes to advocate.